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This appeal asks us to address an issue of first 
impression under the Immigration and Nationality Act (the 
“Act”) that carries implications beyond immigration law:  
whether the categorical approach, which compares the 
elements of prior convictions with the elements of crimes 
under federal law, permits comparison with any federal crime, 
or only the “most similar” one.  That issue arises in noncitizen 
Willy de Jesus Rosa’s petition for review from the 
determination of the Board of Immigration Appeals that his 
prior New Jersey convictions for possession and sale of a 
controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school constitute 
aggravated felonies under the Act.  Specifically, he challenges 
the Board’s conclusion that his prior convictions could be 
compared not only to the federal statute proscribing 
distribution near a school but also to the federal statute 
prohibiting distribution generally.  We agree that the Board 
erred in that conclusion and will grant the petition for review 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. Background  
 
The facts in the administrative record before us may be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Rosa, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was 
admitted to the United States as a legal permanent resident in 
1992, when he was still a child.  When his family arrived in the 
United States, they resided in Paterson, New Jersey, where 
Rosa eventually attended high school.  While Rosa was in high 
school, his family, including five of his seven siblings, moved 
out of state; Rosa remained in New Jersey to complete high 
school. 
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Shortly after he graduated from high school in 2001, 
Rosa lost his job as a car valet and became associated with the 
“wrong people.”1  In 2003, he was arrested for drug charges, 
and on February 20, 2004, he was convicted following a guilty 
plea in New Jersey Superior Court for the possession and sale 
of a controlled substance—cocaine—within 1,000 feet of 
school property in violation of § 2C:35-7 of the New Jersey 
statutes (the “New Jersey School Zone Statute”).2  Eleven years 
later, the Department of Homeland Security served Rosa with 
a Notice to Appear, charging that Rosa was removable for the 
conviction of a controlled substances offense3 and of an 
“aggravated felony”4 for a “drug trafficking crime.”5 
 
Rosa subsequently appeared before an Immigration 
Judge, where he conceded removability for the controlled 
substances offense.  However, he denied removability for the 
aggravated felony, which would have precluded him from 
being eligible for cancellation of removal.6  As required by 
                                              
1 AR 234. 
2 Rosa was charged with the crimes in two separate 
indictments.  In relevant part, § 2C:35-7 provides, “Any person 
who violates [N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:35-5(a)] by distributing, 
dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled 
dangerous substance . . . while on any school property . . . or 
within 1,000 feet of such school property or a school bus, or 
while on any school bus, is guilty of a crime of the third 
degree . . . .”  N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:35-7 (2013). 
3 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
4 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
5 Id. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). 
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Supreme Court precedent, the Immigration Judge applied the 
“categorical approach”7 to determine if Rosa’s state 
convictions qualified as an aggravated felony.  Under the 
categorical approach, the Immigration Judge compared Rosa’s 
statute of conviction, the New Jersey School Zone Statute, with 
the federal statute for distribution “in or near schools and 
colleges” (the “Federal School Zone Statute”).8  The 
Immigration Judge concluded that the state statute swept more 
broadly than its federal counterpart in both its proscribed 
                                              
7 As described below, the categorical approach compares 
“whether ‘the state statute defining the crime of conviction’ 
categorically fits within the ‘generic’ federal definition of a 
corresponding aggravated felony.”  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 
U.S. 184, 190 (2013) (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 
549 U.S. 183, 186 (2007)).  In making that determination, a 
court looks “not to the facts of the particular prior case,” but 
instead only to the elements of the state statute and the 
“generic” federal analog.  Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 186 
(citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)).  If 
the elements of the state conviction “categorically fit[]” within 
the elements of an appropriate federal analog, then the state 
conviction constitutes an aggravated felony.  Moncrieffe, 569 
U.S. at 190 (citing Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 186). 
8 21 U.S.C. § 860.  In relevant part, § 860 provides, “Any 
person who violates [21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) or 856] by 
distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or 
manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one 
thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or 
private elementary, vocational, or secondary school . . . is . . . 
subject to [] twice the maximum punishment authorized by [18 
U.S.C. § 841(b)] . . . .”  Id. § 860. 
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conduct and its definition of “school property.”9  
Consequently, under the categorical approach, Rosa’s state 
conviction was not an “aggravated felony” under federal law,10 
and he was eligible for cancellation of removal, which the 
Immigration Judge granted.11 
 
 The Department of Homeland Security appealed to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals.  The Board determined that, 
under the categorical approach, Rosa’s state conviction could 
be compared to the federal statute generally prohibiting the 
distribution of a controlled substance (the “Federal 
Distribution Statute”)12 as a lesser included offense of the 
Federal School Zone Statute.  The Board concluded that the 
Federal Distribution Statute encompassed the elements of 
Rosa’s state statute of conviction and that the state conviction 
consequently qualified as an aggravated felony.  The Board 
                                              
9 A 30-31. 
10 A 33. 
11 Cancellation of removal is barred for noncitizens convicted 
of aggravated felonies, as defined in 8 U.SC. § 1101(a)(43).  8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).  The Immigration Judge also determined 
that Rosa was removable for a controlled substance offense 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which does not bar 
cancellation of removal.  Rosa did not challenge that 
determination before the Board and does not challenge it 
before us. 
12 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).  That section provides, “[I]t shall be 
unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance . . . .”  Id. 
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therefore determined that Rosa was ineligible for cancellation 
of removal and ordered him removed.  Rosa timely appealed 
to this Court. 
 
II. Discussion13  
On appeal, Rosa contends that the Board of Immigration 
Appeals erred by concluding that his prior convictions could 
be compared to any federal analog under the categorical 
approach.  According to Rosa, a prior conviction can only be 
properly compared to the “most similar” federal analog.  The 
Government responds that nothing in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act prevents it from selecting any federal analog, 
especially those that would be lesser included offenses of the 
prior conviction.  We agree with Rosa that the Board erred and 
hold that the Board’s conclusion runs afoul of longstanding 
federal practice.  We conclude, however, that the record before 
                                              
13 The Board of Immigration Appeals had jurisdiction over the 
Department of Homeland Security’s appeal from the 
Immigration Judge’s cancellation of Rosa’s removal under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).  We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s 
final order of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), limited to 
“constitutional claims or questions of law,” id. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).  We review the Board’s determination 
that Rosa’s state convictions constituted an aggravated felony 
de novo.  Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 
2008).  “When the BIA issues its own decision on the merits, 
rather than a summary affirmance, we review its decision, not 
that of the IJ.”  Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 282 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting Chavez-Alvarez v. Att’y Gen., 783 F.3d 478, 
482 (3d Cir. 2015)). 
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us is insufficient to properly compare the New Jersey and 
Federal School Zone Statutes and remand for further 
proceedings to supplement the record. 
 
A.   Applicable Law 
 The Board determined that Rosa’s prior convictions 
constituted aggravated felonies under the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act pursuant to what is known as the 
“categorical approach.”  The categorical approach “asks only 
whether the elements of a federal criminal statute can be 
satisfied by reference to the actual statute of conviction.”14  
Consequently, a court looks “‘not to the facts of the particular 
prior case,’ but instead to whether ‘the state statute defining the 
crime of conviction’ categorically fits within the ‘generic’ 
federal definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.”15   If 
the elements of the state conviction “fit[]” within the elements 
of the appropriate federal offense, then the state conviction 
constitutes an aggravated felony.16  Consequently, “a state 
crime cannot qualify as an [aggravated felony] if its elements 
are broader than those of a listed generic offense.”17 
 Although the categorical approach originally emerged 
in the Supreme Court’s decisions on the Armed Career 
                                              
14 Evanson, 550 F.3d at 292 (quoting Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 
F.3d 144, 161 (2004)).   
15 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190 (quoting Duenas-Alvarez, 549 
U.S. at 186).   
16 Id. 
17 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016); 
accord Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590. 
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Criminal Act,18 courts have extended the approach to certain 
“aggravated felonies” under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.19  In particular, the categorical approach is applied to 
determine if a drug offense may be deemed an “aggravated 
felony”20 through “either one of two routes”21 under the Act:  
(1) for “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,”22 which 
“must involve ‘the unlawful trading or dealing of a controlled 
substance’” 23 and was held by the Board not necessary for it to 
consider to reach its decision here; or, (2) for “a drug 
                                              
18 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 
19 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190; cf. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 
U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (interpreting the language Congress used in 
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(M)(i) for “fraud or deceit” as requiring 
a “circumstance-specific” rather than categorical approach); 
Singh, 383 F.3d at 148 (“[I]n some cases the language of the 
particular subsection of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) at issue will 
invite inquiry into the underlying facts of the case, and in some 
cases the disjunctive phrasing of the statute of conviction will 
similarly invite inquiry into the specifics of the conviction.”). 
20 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
21 Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 313 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Although the language of § 1101(a)(43) appears to “create[] a 
single category” of “illicit trafficking,” with a subcategory for 
“drug trafficking crimes,” we have previously concluded that 
the legislative history of the section shows that Congress 
sought to create two distinct routes for establishing a drug 
offense as an aggravated felony.  Id. at 307 n.8 (citing Steele v. 
Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 136 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
22 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
23 Evanson, 550 F.3d at 289. 
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trafficking crime,”24 defined as “any felony punishable under 
the Controlled Substances Act.”25  
 
 Section 924(c)(4) not only incorporates the Controlled 
Substances Act in defining a “drug trafficking crime,” but it 
“encompasses all state offenses that ‘proscrib[e] conduct 
punishable as a felony under [the CSA].’”26  The categorical 
approach, sometimes labelled the “hypothetical federal felony 
approach,”27 is applied to determine whether a state offense 
defines a felony under the Controlled Substances Act.28  If the 
                                              
24 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
25 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), cited and incorporated in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B).  
26 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 192 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)). 
27 See Singh, 383 F.3d at 157.  In this Circuit, “[t]he 
hypothetical federal felony approach is essentially the formal 
categorical approach of Taylor, as applied to a specific federal 
statute.”  Id.; Evanson, 550 F.3d at 292 n.5; Gerbier, 280 F.3d 
at 315.  To the extent that other Circuits have framed the 
hypothetical felony approach as asking whether “the ‘conduct’ 
that gave rise to [the prior] conviction would have been 
punished as a felony in federal court,” it has been rejected by 
the Supreme Court.  Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 
563, 580 (2010).  Instead, as described here, we are limited to 
examining the elements of the prior conviction. 
28 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190 (“When the Government alleges 
that a state conviction qualifies as an ‘aggravated felony’ under 
the INA, we generally employ a ‘categorical approach’ to 
determine whether the state offense is comparable to an offense 
listed in the INA.” (citing Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 33-38; 
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state offense is narrower than, or the same as, the generic 
federal analog under the Controlled Substance Act, it 
constitutes an aggravated felony under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.29 
 
 Before determining if the state offense is narrower or 
broader than its federal analog, a court must determine which 
state offense the defendant was convicted of.  If the relevant 
state statute defines a single crime—known as an “indivisible” 
statute—the analysis is “straightforward.”30  If, however, the 
statute defines multiple crimes in multiple subdivisions or by 
“list[ing] elements in the alternative,” it is “divisible,” and the 
analysis requires an extra step described below.31  To 
determine whether a statute is divisible or indivisible, courts 
are permitted to examine the statute itself and state court 
decisions and to “peek” at the “record of a prior conviction,”32 
including the charging documents, plea agreement, plea 
colloquy, and jury instructions.33  A statute may be indivisible 
even if it has disjunctive phrasing—listing various components 
                                              
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 185-187)); Lopez, 549 U.S. at 60; 
id. at 55 (“Unless a state offense is punishable as a federal 
felony it does not count.”). 
29 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. 
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 2249. 
32 Id. at 2256-57 (quoting Rendon v. Holder, 782 F. 3d 466, 
473-474 (9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial 
of reh’g en banc)). 
33 Id. at 2249, 2253, 2256-67. 
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as alternatives—if it merely “enumerates various factual means 
of committing a single element.”34 
 
 An indivisible statute defining a single crime is assessed 
under the “formal categorical approach” outlined above.35  
However, a divisible statute listing multiple crimes with 
different elements requires courts to go an extra step beyond 
the categorical approach and employ the “modified categorical 
approach” to determine of which crime the defendant was 
convicted.36  “‘Elements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a 
crime’s legal definition—the things the ‘prosecution must 
prove to sustain a conviction.’”37  Under the modified 
categorical approach, the court may look to a limited class of 
documents—“for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or 
plea agreement and colloquy”—solely to determine under 
which portion of the statute and under which elements—the 
defendant was convicted.38  Once a court has used the modified 
                                              
34 Id. at 2249.   For example, in Mathis itself, the Supreme 
Court concluded that Iowa’s burglary statute, which defined 
burglary as occurring in “any building, structure, [or] land, 
water, or air vehicle,” was indivisible because the Iowa 
Supreme Court had concluded that the listed locations were 
merely “alternative ways of satisfying a single locational 
element.”  Id. at 2250 (alteration in original) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Iowa Code §702.12 (2013)). 
35 Evanson, 550 F.3d at 290. 
36 Id.  
37 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (quoting Elements of Crime, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). 
38 Id. These documents are often referred to as “Shepard 
documents” for the case in which the Supreme Court chiefly 
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categorical approach to “determine what crime, with what 
elements, a defendant was convicted of,” then it may “compare 
that crime, as the categorical approach commands, with the 
relevant generic offense.”39 
 
 It is under this law that we analyze Rosa’s arguments. 
B. The Categorical Approach Is Limited to the 
Most Similar Federal Analog 
 We conclude, first, that the Board erred in permitting 
Rosa’s statute of conviction to be compared to multiple federal 
analogs.  Instead, longstanding practice in federal court limits 
that comparison to only the most similar federal analog. 
1. Longstanding Federal Practice  
 First, the Board’s determination runs afoul of 
longstanding practice in the Supreme Court and this Court that 
has treated prior convictions as having only one federal analog.  
That practice is underscored by the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Taylor v. United States40 and its subsequent decisions. 
 
                                              
outlined their use, Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 
(2005).  The Supreme Court envisions use of the Shepard 
documents as a two-step process, first to determine whether 
“an alternatively phrased statute” lists elements or means, and 
second, if the items listed in the statute are elements, to 
determine which of those elements were implicated in the 
defendant’s conviction.  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 & n.7. 
39 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. 
40 495 U.S. 575. 
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In Taylor, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s 
conclusion that “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act “means ‘burglary’ however a state chooses to define it.”41 
The Court reasoned that Congress could not have intended to 
premise application of that Act on the “vagaries”42 of state law.  
Various states, for example, might not have any offense 
“formally labeled ‘burglary,’” but instead multiple statutes 
covering “breaking and entering.”43  Other states might cover 
shoplifting or theft from automobiles44 and coin machines 
under the umbrella of “burglary.”45  The Court reasoned that 
each of these statutes, despite their many variations, must be 
covered by “some uniform definition independent of the 
labels” and statutory schemes “employed by the various States’ 
criminal codes.”46  That uniform definition was to cover prior 
convictions that, “while not called ‘burglary,’ correspond in 
substantial part to generic burglary.”47 
 
 The Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions regarding 
the categorical approach emphasize that a prior conviction will 
be compared to the most similar federal analog.  For example, 
in Shepard v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the defendant’s prior convictions under Massachusetts law 
                                              
41 Id. at 579 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 864 F.2d 625, 
627 (8th Cir. 1989)). 
42 Id. at 588. 
43 Id. at 591 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110 (1979)). 
44 Id. (citing Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 459 (West Supp. 1990)). 
45 Id. (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 30.01-30.05 (1989 and 
Supp. 1990)). 
46 Id. at 592. 
47 Id. at 599 (emphasis added). 
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were broader than “generic” federal burglary.48  Although the 
state statutes were merely labelled “breaking/entering,”49 the 
Court nonetheless compared them to “the generic offense” for 
burglary.50  According to the Shepard Court, a prior conviction 
could fall within “the generic limit”51 only if evident from the 
statute, a plea colloquy regarding “the generic fact,” or “the 
generic implication of a jury’s verdict.”52 
 
Similarly, in Mathis, the Court described the categorical 
approach as comparing a statute of conviction “with the 
relevant generic offense.”53  Likewise, in Descamps v. United 
States, the Court described “the generic offense” for a 
particular statute of conviction as “the offense as commonly 
understood.”54  Those statements, with the use of the definite 
article “the,” all presuppose that a given statute of conviction 
has a single generic analog. 
 
 Our own jurisprudence has similarly underscored that 
prior convictions will only have a single generic federal 
analog.  In Gerbier v. Holmes, we concluded that a Delaware 
conviction for possession of cocaine did not qualify as an 
aggravated felony.55  In reaching that conclusion, we rejected 
                                              
48 544 U.S. at 17. 
49 Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266, §§ 16, 18 (2000); see Shepard, 
544 U.S. at 31 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
50 544 U.S. at 17. 
51 Id. (emphasis added). 
52 Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added). 
53 136 S. Ct. at 2249. 
54 570 U.S. at 257. 
55 280 F.3d at 317. 
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one provision of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802, as “the appropriate federal analog[]” because it did not 
“define[] substantive federal drug offenses,” but only the terms 
used elsewhere in the Controlled Substances Act.56  Instead, 
we concluded that 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) was “the pertinent 
federal analog,”57 because it proscribed the same conduct. 
 
 The Government argues, however, that Gerbier actually 
“embraced the idea of multiple potential federal analogues.”58  
That argument is misplaced.  The language used by the Gerbier 
court expressly rejected § 802 as an “appropriate federal 
analog[]” and instead concluded that “the pertinent federal 
analog” was 21 U.S.C. § 844.59  As with the language 
employed by the Supreme Court, longstanding practice in this 
Court has steadfastly presupposed that prior convictions will 
have only a single, uniform federal analog.60  The 
Government’s position would upend that practice. 
 
                                              
56 Id. at 316 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(13), (44)). 
57 Id. 
58 Respondent Br. at 16. 
59 Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 316. 
60 See Singh, 839 F.3d at 285 (“This is the appropriate generic 
federal offense analog for convictions for ‘knowingly 
possessing with intent to deliver a counterfeit controlled 
substance’ . . . .” (emphasis added)); Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 
F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The analogous federal criminal 
provision is 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which proscribes the 
identical conduct.”). 
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2. Congressional Intent  
 
Application of the categorical approach is ultimately 
dictated by Congress’s intent in passing the relevant statute.61  
“[T]he Supreme Court has always rooted the categorical 
approach in the statutory language chosen by Congress and 
consistently defended this approach as a means of effectuating 
congressional intent.”62  Consequently, the “categorical 
approach is dictated by the text of the statute and Congress’s 
intent to impose increased penalties based on the violation of 
certain predicate statutes.”63 
 
                                              
61 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2252 (“Our decisions have given 
three basic reasons for adhering to an elements-only inquiry. 
First, ACCA’s text favors that approach.”); Nijhawan, 557 
U.S. at 34 (“In Taylor and James we held that ACCA’s 
language read naturally uses the word ‘felony’ to refer to a 
generic crime as generally committed.”); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
588-89 (“[T]he 1984 definition of burglary shows that 
Congress, at least at that time, had in mind a modern ‘generic’ 
view of burglary. . . .”). 
62 United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 240 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(en banc); accord Singh, 383 F.3d at 164 (concluding that the 
statutory text and legislative history of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act “support[] the conclusion that Congress 
intended Taylor’s formal categorical approach to be applied” 
to “sexual abuse of a minor” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)). 
63 Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1299 (11th Cir. 
2018) (en banc) (Pryor, J., dissenting) 
 
18 
 
Here, an “aggravated felony” is defined under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act64 in part as encompassing 
“any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances 
Act.”65  That definition incorporates the entirety of the 
substantive felony offenses under the Controlled Substances 
Act66 as aggravated felonies under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.  Notably, Congress did not limit the list of 
potential federal analogs to lesser included offenses67 such as 
simple possession,68 possession with intent to distribute,69 or 
distribution.70  Where Congress has decided to incorporate a 
                                              
64 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
65 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), incorporated in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B). 
66 Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 315-16. 
67 Offense, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
“lesser included offense” as a “crime that is composed of some, 
but not all, of the elements of a more serious crime and that is 
necessarily committed in carrying out the greater crime”). 
68 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).  Simple possession qualifies as a felony 
under the Controlled Substances Act when the prosecution 
charges and proves the existence of a prior conviction for 
possession.  Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 568.  As a 
sentencing factor, however, that proof may be by a 
preponderance of the evidence and may be found by a judge, 
rather than by a jury.  Id. at 567 n.3. 
69 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  We have previously concluded that 
the Federal Distribution Statute, id., is a lesser included offense 
of the Federal School Statute, id. § 860.  United States v. 
Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2010). 
70 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).   
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range of substantive offenses as generic federal analogs under 
the categorical approach, we must give that decision full effect. 
 
The Supreme Court has instructed that Congress 
intended for the categorical approach to take full account of the 
actual prior conviction.  In Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, the 
Court concluded that, of simple possession convictions, only 
“recidivist simple possession” qualified as a felony under the 
Controlled Substances Act and that a prosecutor must have 
charged and proven an antecedent possession conviction 
before a judge in state proceedings.71  In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court emphasized that the text of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act requires a noncitizen to have 
“been convicted of a[n] aggravated felony.”72  According to the 
Court, that “text thus indicates that we are to look to the 
conviction itself as our starting place, not to what might have 
or could have been charged.”73   
Although Carachuri addressed offenses that had been 
charged as misdemeanors, that same principle applies here: 
Rosa was charged with and convicted of a greater offense—
sale of a controlled substance within a school zone74—with the 
additional school zone element not included in the lesser 
offense.  The Government cannot now avoid the implications 
of Rosa’s actual conviction. 
                                              
71 560 U.S. at 568-69. 
72 Id. at 576 (emphasis and alteration in original). 
73 Id. at 576, 578. 
74 See State v. Ivory, 592 A.2d 205, 210 (N.J. 1991) (“The first 
step in determining whether N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 has been 
violated is to see whether N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a has been 
violated.”). 
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In response, the Government raises two contentions, 
neither of which is availing.  First, it argues that the term “illicit 
trafficking in a controlled substance” under “the text of 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B)” is the relevant generic analog, which is 
satisfied by any felony under the Controlled Substances Act.75  
That argument has some support in decisions by the Supreme 
Court and this Court.  For example, in Moncrieffe v. Holder, 
the Supreme Court analyzed its earlier decision in Carachuri-
Rosendo as concluding that “‘illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance’ is a ‘generic crim[e]’ to which the categorical 
approach applies.”76  Similarly, in Singh v. Attorney General, 
we stated, “The relevant federal ‘corresponding aggravated 
felony’ here is ‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . . . 
including a drug trafficking crime . . . .’”77  That language 
seems to support the argument that the proper federal analog is 
merely the provisions of § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
 
However, neither of those decisions rested on that 
cursory analysis.  The Moncrieffe Court recognized that the 
proper federal analog in Carachuri-Rosendo was not merely 
“illicit trafficking.”  Instead, it determined that “the generic 
federal offense” in Carachuri-Rosendo was ultimately the 
underlying provision of the Controlled Substance Act, 
                                              
75 Respondent Br. at 17. 
76 569 U.S. at 202 (alteration in original) (quoting Nijhawan, 
557 U.S. at 37) (citing Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 576-78 
n. 11). 
77 839 F.3d at 285. 
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“recidivist simple possession.”78  Similarly, in Singh, we 
concluded that “the appropriate generic federal offense analog” 
was not just “illicit trafficking,” but the underlying provision 
of the Controlled Substances Act proscribing “knowingly . . . 
posses[sing] with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit 
substance.”79  In each of those cases, the court followed 
Congress’s intent in comparing the actual state convictions to 
their most similar federal analog in the Controlled Substances 
Act. 
 
Second, the Government contends that the term “any” 
in the definition of a “drug trafficking crime” 80 is ambiguous 
and the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals is 
entitled to deference under Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resource 
Defense Council.81  In the alternative, the Government 
contends that, even in the absence of deference under Chevron, 
the term still authorizes it to choose among federal analogs.  
Neither of those contentions has merit.  We have previously 
held that the Board is not entitled to deference under Chevron 
when interpreting § 924(c), because “the interpretation and 
exposition of criminal law is a task outside the BIA’s sphere of 
special competence.”82  “[T]he specified section at issue in this 
case is part of the federal criminal code that is incorporated by 
                                              
78 569 U.S. at 195-96 (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. 
at 567). 
79 839 F.3d at 285 (omission and alteration in original) (quoting 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(2)). 
80 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), incorporated in 8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(43)(B). 
81 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
82 Singh, 383 F.3d at 151. 
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reference into the INA.  As such, the BIA’s expertise in 
interpreting the INA is not implicated in a meaningful way and 
we need not defer to it.”83  Likewise, the term “any” cannot 
carry the authorization the Government imparts to it in this 
context.  Although the term is undoubtedly broad, in this 
context, we cannot infer that Congress intended, with that one 
word, for lesser included offenses to effectively serve as the 
sole federal analogs for “any felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act.”84  
 
Thus, we conclude that Congress intended for prior 
convictions to be compared to their most similar federal 
analogs.  
 
3. Determining the “Most Similar” Federal 
Analog 
 
 With the above principles in mind, we turn to 
identifying the proper federal analog for Rosa’s conviction.  As 
noted above, our analysis is guided by longstanding practice in 
this Court and the Supreme Court, and that practice has 
developed in order to effect congressional intent.  We have 
reasoned that Congress would not have incorporated the 
entirety of substantive felony offenses under the Controlled 
Substances Act as federal analogs if it also intended to permit 
prosecutors and immigration officials to resort to the federal 
analogs with the least number of elements.  Therefore, we 
                                              
83 Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 302 n.2; accord Salmoran v. Att’y Gen., 
909 F.3d 73, 77 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Singh v. Att’y Gen., 677 
F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
84 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). 
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conclude that, when selecting a generic federal analog, courts 
must, when possible, select an analog that has elements that 
may be “line[d] up”85 with each of the elements of the prior 
conviction.  
  
 The application of those principles in this case is 
straightforward.   Rosa’s statute of conviction, the New Jersey 
School Zone Statute,86 has three elements that may be 
described as:  (1) “distributing, dispensing or possessing with 
intent to distribute” (2) “a controlled dangerous substance” (3) 
“while on any school property.”87  The Federal Distribution 
Statute, however, lacks that critical third element, requiring 
only that a person (1) knowingly or intentionally “manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense” (2) “a controlled substance.”88  Because 
it lacks what may be described as a location element, the 
Federal Distribution Statute is not a proper analog to the New 
Jersey School Zone Statute.  Instead, the Federal School Zone 
Statute supplies that missing element89 and is the proper federal 
                                              
85 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. 
86 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:35-7(a). 
87 See State v. Gregory, 106 A.3d 1207, 1210 (N.J. 2015) (“The 
elements of [possession with the intent to distribute under § 
2C:35-7(a)] were (1) possession of a controlled dangerous 
substance, (2) with the purposeful or knowing intent to 
distribute the substance, and (3) within 1000 feet of any school 
property.”). 
88 21 U.S.C § 841(a). 
89 Petersen, 622 F.3d at 204 (“Section 860 is therefore a 
substantive offense that requires proof of an element that is not 
included in § 841—proof that the distribution, possession or 
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analog.90  Consequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
erred in concluding that it could select a generic federal analog 
from any provision of the Controlled Substances Act and in 
comparing Rosa’s statute of conviction to the general Federal 
Distribution Statute.  
B. The Record Is Insufficient to Determine 
Whether the New Jersey School Zone Statute 
Is Divisible 
 Having determined that the Federal School Zone Statute 
is the proper generic analog for Rosa’s conviction under the 
New Jersey School Zone Statute, we now “compare that crime, 
as the categorical approach commands, with the relevant 
generic offense.”91   As noted above, the New Jersey School 
Zone Statute provides: 
 
Any person who violates subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:35-
5 by distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent 
to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or 
controlled substance analog while on any school 
property used for school purposes which is owned by or 
leased to any elementary or secondary school or school 
board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property or a 
                                              
manufacturing occurred within 1000 feet of a schoolyard.”); 
United States v. McQuilkin, 78 F.3d 105, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“Although § 860 refers to § 841 . . . it requires a separate and 
distinct element—distribution within 1,000 feet of a school.”). 
90 We leave open for another day the proper procedure if no 
federal analog fulfills the conditions we describe here or if two 
or more do. 
91 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. 
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school bus, or while on any school bus, is guilty of a 
crime of the third degree and shall, except as provided 
in N.J.S.2C:35-12, be sentenced by the court to a term 
of imprisonment.92 
The conduct and location elements of that statute, however, are 
disjunctive, and before applying the categorical approach, our 
“first task” is to determine whether it is divisible or 
indivisible—that is, whether it lists alternative elements and 
thereby defines separate crimes or merely lists alternative 
means to commit a single crime.93 
 
The “threshold inquiry” of “elements or means,”94 can 
be quickly resolved if the statute is clear on its face or there are 
prior state court decisions definitively answering the question. 
                                              
92 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:35-7. 
93 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.  Rosa directs our analysis 
toward the conduct element, “distributing, dispensing or 
possessing with intent to distribute,” contending that it extends 
beyond the conduct covered by the Federal School Statute.  
The Government has not responded to Rosa’s contentions 
regarding the conduct element of the New Jersey School 
Statute, presumably because we already concluded in a non-
precedential opinion that a conviction under the New Jersey 
School Statute could not constitute an aggravated felony under 
the categorical approach.  Chang-Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 659 F. 
App’x 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2016).  Because Chang-Cruz is non-
precedential, however, it does not bind this panel and, pursuant 
to longstanding practice in this Court, we will not otherwise 
cite to or rely on it. See Third Cir. Internal Operating P. 5.7. 
94 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249, 2256. 
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95  However, where the statute itself and state law fail to 
provide clear answers, courts may look “to a limited class of 
documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or 
plea agreement and colloquy).”96  If those documents 
“reiterat[e] all the terms of” the statute of conviction or “use a 
single umbrella term” to cover all those terms, the statute is 
likely indivisible, listing only means to commit a single 
crime.97  Conversely, if the documents “referenc[e] one 
alternative term to the exclusion of all others,” the statute is 
likely divisible, listing different elements, “each one of which 
goes toward a separate crime.”98  Only if the statute lists 
different elements may we use those same documents under 
the modified categorical approach to determine which 
elements were relied on in the prior conviction.99  If the statue 
is indivisible, however, we proceed directly to a comparison of 
the statutes’ elements under the categorical approach.  
However, if the documents listed above do not “speak plainly,” 
the record will not be able to satisfy the “demand for certainty” 
required “when determining whether a defendant was 
convicted of a generic offense.”100  
                                              
95 Id. at 2256-57. 
96 Id. at 2249. 
97 Id. at 2257 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2257 (stating that, after asking whether the listed items 
are elements of the offense, “Only [then] if the answer is yes 
can the court make further use of the materials, as previously 
described, see supra, at 2253-2254.”); id. at 2253 (describing 
use of the same materials in the modified categorical 
approach). 
100 Id. at 2257 (quoting Shepard, 544 U. S. at 21). 
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In this case, the text of the New Jersey School Zone 
Statute and New Jersey case law do not definitively determine 
whether the disjunctively phrased conduct and location 
elements of that statute are divisible or indivisible.101  
Therefore, the Court may look to a limited class of underlying 
documents to determine divisibility.  However, the record 
before us in this case is one that does not “speak plainly.”  In 
particular, we find that the record is too limited to permit us to 
determine if the various items listed in the New Jersey School 
Zone Statute are means or elements or, if necessary, to 
determine which of those elements played a role in Rosa’s 
conviction.  In our review of the record, we were unable to 
locate Rosa’s plea agreement or plea colloquy or a charging 
document for his possession charge.  Although we do have the 
judgments of conviction for Rosa’s convictions for both 
                                              
101 Although some case law suggests that New Jersey courts 
treat the New Jersey School Zone Statute’s conduct element 
listing distributing, dispensing or possessing as alternate means 
of fulfilling a single element, the Court is not aware of any New 
Jersey case definitively resolving the issue. See, e.g., State v. 
Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 645 A.2d 1165, 1185 (1994) 
(upholding, on other grounds, a jury charge stating that, “to 
find against [the defendant] on this element, the State must 
prove ‘he knew that it was cocaine and intended to distribute 
or dispense it to [another]’ ” (emphasis added)); State v. 
Wilkinson, 126 N.J. Super. 553, 316 A.2d 6, 8 (1973) 
(concluding that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the 
defendant was guilty of “possession of marijuana with intent 
to distribute or dispense it”). 
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possession and “sale” of controlled substances,102 we have 
previously held that “we may not look to factual assertions in 
the judgment of sentence.”103  Furthermore, the jury 
instructions available for the New Jersey School Zone Statute 
fail to clarify whether the conduct at issue consists of elements 
or means. There is only one set of jury instructions for 
distributing or dispensing on school property, which suggests 
that distributing and dispensing are interchangeable means. 
However, there is a separate set of instructions for possession 
with the intent to distribute on school property, which may 
indicate that the conduct consists of different elements that the 
jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury 
instructions, absent support from the other Shepard documents 
from Rosa’s criminal case, are inconclusive.  Thus, we remand 
to the Board for further proceedings to supplement the record; 
if the record cannot be supplemented to satisfy the “demand 
for certainty” in analyzing whether the statute lists means or 
elements, Rosa cannot be found to have committed an 
aggravated felony.104 
 
                                              
102 AR 564-68. 
103 Evanson, 550 F.3d at 293; accord Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26 
(limiting application of the categorical approach following a 
guilty plea “to the terms of the charging document, the terms 
of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge 
and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was 
confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial 
record of this information”). 
104 See Evanson, 550 F.3d at 293-94. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review will 
be granted and the order of removal will be vacated and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
